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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY Poland

SUBJECT An Evaluation of the Potential of the Gomulka Group  
and Poland's Political FuturePLACE ACQUIRED - - -  
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- 25X1A 1. In response to your questions regarding the group mentioned [redacted], of course, I was referring to the Gomulka group. Although it is called the heresy of Gomulka, it was more of a general nature than it was expressive of Gomulka's own attitudes. His heresy [by Soviet standards] included those Poles interested in instituting a national Communism (a type of Tito Yugoslavian Communism). Therefore, it included not only those concerned with the economic interests of Poland as the guiding factor in forming the policy, but also Communist Nationalism in every other field.
2. There is no doubt in my mind that Gomulka was an orthodox Communist himself, that he planned a definitely Communist structure of future Poland, that he was accepting the USSR as a most reliable ally of Poland, and a kind of political partnership in which Poland would naturally play the role of a junior partner. But Gomulka wouldn't go beyond that which he considered a concession.
3. Through his public utterances, with reference to the above attitudes, Gomulka gained relatively great popularity among the much hated Communist leaders. By giving an impression of sincere attachment to Polish independence and cultural traditions, and by bringing before the public a mirage of a strong nationally united and economically independent Poland, he became a focus of new hope for the masses. Not only the opportunists, but also quite a number of die hard anti-Communists saw in him a lesser evil to be chosen under the circumstances.
4. Some optimists went so far as to suspect that Gomulka had reformed, had seen clearly through Kremlin arms or, as a matter of fact, was only paying lip service to the Communist regime while at heart trying to save for Poland as much as could be saved. It is doubtful whether we will ever know which of these appraisals by Gomulka is correct.

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5. Nevertheless, the clash between the USSR and Gomulka was inevitable, for Soviet plans to exploit Poland and make of her a Soviet colony couldn't be impeded by Gomulka or his attitudes. His attitudes, of course, sealed his fate; nevertheless, his period of popularity and his personal influence (exercised up to that time) resulted in the development of a Gomulka school of thought among his followers.
6. After the downfall of Gomulka, several of his followers were apprehended and liquidated. There is every reason to believe that large numbers of his followers are now [1954] in the ranks of the Communist bureaucracy in Poland with some of them occupying important positions.
7. The idea of the national interests of Poland, though watered down to a level which will not endanger the individual, recur from time to time in the government controlled press or even in some utterances made by the officials or Mr. Beirut himself. Such isolated occurrences appear to be derived from the first attempt of Polish Communists to defend Polish national interests of which Gomulka was the initiator. The downfall of Gomulka was a severe blow to the expansion of the Communist Party for Gomulka's Polish patriotism (although degenerated by his Communist doctrine) was accepted by less critical masses as a proof that one could remain a good Pole at heart and still become a Communist Party member. That kind of emotional propaganda was extremely important for the success of recruiting new Party members in Poland.
8. In the realization of the importance of the above by die hard Communists who pledged their unreserved allegiance to the Kremlin, Gomulka owes a longer period of impunity than that ordinarily applied to those who deviate from the party line. He probably also owes to it the fact that he was spared the ordeal of a public trial, sentencing and execution. Gomulka's retractions and penances have not been accepted by the general population as being a sincere confession of guilt. The Poles who have since left Poland (those with whom I have spoken) surmise that the contrary is fact. They feel that Gomulka's recants and retractions were the only means by which he could escape liquidation.
9. From what we Poles hear, Gomulka is still alive and one shouldn't discard the eventuality of his renewed appearance on the public scene, provided it suits the plans and interests of the Soviet Union. Although it is now impossible to foresee under what circumstances the Kremlin would decide to use Gomulka again, one thing appears to be certain and that is that an acute emergency could make them do so. As an example of such an emergency, ~~one should~~ cite the following situation: "East-West relations coming to a breaking point, with both sides confronted with an inevitable armed conflict, particularly if the Germans were on the side of the Western Democracies and if they were using the slogan, 'liberating the Eastern provinces taken by Poland.' The Kremlin desires to secure the loyalty, not only of some fifty Polish divisions, but of the entire 25 million Poles. The above would, in my estimation, bring Gomulka to the forefront, the same Gomulka whom at least a part of the population considers a martyr in the cause of trying to serve Poland first.
10. Under such circumstances Gomulka would have the greatest assets to become overnight a national hero leading the nation to oppose what would be qualified as a new German aggression [the propaganda line which the USSR would probably follow]. Of course, such an appointment for Gomulka would only be temporary. I wouldn't mean a change in the Kremlin's overall plans but would be suffered by the USSR for the sake of expediency only so long as necessary." I feel that Gomulka would make a reentry to the Polish political scene under less dramatic circumstances in the event of mass protests against economic exploitation and poverty should the Kremlin decide not to use brutal force to repress such masses. That is, if the Kremlin decided to pacify the minds of Polish citizenry by temporarily relaxing its strangulating rules.

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11. With the beginning of 1948 the attacks on Gomulka began -- first at Party gatherings, then in the press -- by those accusing him of a series of serious sins against the Party line. These sins consisted of so-called rightist deviation in agrarian and German problems.
12. In June 1948, Gomulka made his first strong public utterances in which he condemned the internationalist and pro-Russian social democratic party of Poland. His speech stripped of all verbiage meant that Poland should disassociate itself from the forthcoming feud condemning Tito and that Poland, without becoming anti-Russian or pro-Russian, should under Polish Communism jealously guard its independence and national sovereignty. For this statement Gomulka was forced to recant.
13. Gomulka's internal thinking process of course coincided with processes which could be observed in other Satellite countries. In my opinion, he realized that he could not effect Titoism in Poland which was surrounded by other Satellites, but that his aim was to safeguard Poland's interests in line with Polish orthodox Communism.
14. In general, the two basic sins (from the Communist point of view) committed by Gomulka were as follows:
  - A. The sin of rightist deviation which manifested itself in opposing forced agricultural collectivization and in sponsoring such collectivization by persuasion. In other words, he advised a slower tempo of collectivization. This approach was assumed by Gomulka in the interests of the Communist Party because after the escape of Mikolajczyk, Gomulka was regarded by many as the second best bet of the peasants. In addition to that, he had good insight concerning the attitude of the peasants. As you will recall, in about 1948, the peasants were definitely opposed to any form of collectivization and were even ready to revolt in some manner. In the opinion of Gomulka, it could have built a long lasting resentment of the Communists by the peasants and would have made them enemies of the Party -- this Gomulka tried to avoid. For that reason he also advocated caution against forcibly merging the peasant party with the workers' party because he knew that the peasants were opposed to such a merger.
  - B. The second point of discord which eventually became a platform against Gomulka came from another quarter. In 1945 he was appointed Minister of the Recovered Territories (the territories acquired from Germany). His policy in incorporating this territory led to further accusation -- for this he was accused of nationalist tendencies. The second accusation against Gomulka (formulated by the chief organ of the PZPR, the newspaper Nowe Droge [New Ways]) which expressed itself in the following manner: "Gomulka, who did not have faith in the strength of the Soviet Union and the strength of the Polish working class, certainly could not have faith in the strength and the future of the German working class. For that reason, he voiced the petty theories of the National Democrats, that fundamentally all Germans are equally inimical to Poland and that we should, therefore, treat them as one treats the alien, uncompromisingly inimical class of land owners." -- Nowe Droge, October 1950.
15. Perhaps the most significant individual and the foremost accuser of Gomulka was Roman Zambrowski. (I believe his real name is Muszuma.) Roman Zambrowski was at that time Vice-Marshal, member of the PZPR, the State Council, all in addition to his duties as Chairman of the Commission to Combat Economic Abuse and Sabotage. He served in the Red Army of Berling, returning to Poland after the Lublin Committee was formed. Zambrowski was a strong advocate of immediate and total collectivization of agriculture and dissipation of the stubborn Polish Kulaks if need be.
16. One of the more important supporters of Gomulka liquidated by orders from the Kremlin was Marian Spychalski [Former Assistant Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and former Vice-Minister of National Defense]. His independent ideas, referred to as Spychalskism, conformed to Gomulka's. These were the sins that brought about his liquidation.

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17. With reference to the question, "Whom will Moscow appoint in the March elections?" I cannot at the moment submit specific names of such individuals. However, it is obvious that the revision of party statutes will not in any sense affect the individual status of the Polish citizens. No matter what the statutes in a Communist state say, the citizenry is not governed by the written law, but only by its interpretation. For that matter, the USSR has one of the most beautifully written constitutions in existence, but in practice the people live miserably without any protection from it. The real interpretation of such constitutions is done by Party members and by the secret police -- Poland is no exception.

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